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Abstract
Evidence on the existence of investments that are good hedges
against unexpected inflation is sparse. In this study we demonstrate a
procedure for forming common stock portfolios whose returns covary
positively with unanticipated inflation, and show that such portfolios
can be used to hedge against purchasing power risk.

"Evidence on the Existence of Common Stock Inflation Hedges"
I. Introduction
Although asset payoffs are in nominal terms, rational investors
should seek investments which are efficient in real terms. Despite this
seemingly obvious interest in real wealth maximization, initial versions
of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) by Sharpe [1964] and others
were expressed in nominal terms and utility maximization involved holding
combinations of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio only. However,
several recent extensions of capital asset pricing theory have dealt with
maximization of the expected utility of real wealth. Within this context,
the rationale for holding an additional asset called a hedge portfolio
is provided. For example, Long's [1974] multi-period CAFM shows that
rational investors should hold long (short) positions in hedge portfolios
to hedge against (or speculate on) unanticipated shifts in the price level
and other factors affecting lifetime consumption. More recently, Manaster
[1979] and Sercu [1981] have shown, in a single-period setting, procedures
for transforming nominally-efficient portfolios into real-efficient
portfolios through the addition of an inflation hedge portfolio.
Once one leaves the realm of theory, the need for empirical identi-
fication of inflation hedge portfolios arises. To date, there has been
little empirical evidence of the ability to identify such portfolios
on an ex ante basis. Without such evidence, it is difficult to verify
those capital asset pricing theories which are developed in an inflationary
environment.
Our purpose in what follows is to present evidence of the existence
of common stock inflation hedge portfolios and to explain a procedure
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for building such portfolios. The balance of the paper is organized
as follows. Part II reviews previous empirical evidence concerning the
existence of inflation hedging potential. Part III is devoted to our
hedging strategy. Here we first consider some characteristics of a
successful hedging strategy and then examine the hedging potential of
both the market portfolio and individual common stocks. We then develop
our strategy and present the results of hedging against the risk asso-
ciated with one particular nominally-efficient portfolio: a portfolio
consisting only of default-free fixed-income securities. While we deal
with only one portfolio from the efficient set, the portfolio is of
special interest since its only source of risk is purchasing power risk.
Our results indicate that a common stock hedge portfolio could have
reduced the variance of real returns on Treasury bills by over 26 percent
over the 1974-1979 period. In Part IV, the hedging strategy is modified
slightly to allow comparison with a test performed by Schipper and Thompson
[1981] in a multi-period setting. Conclusions follow in Part V.
II. Previous Attempts to Identify Inflation Hedges
Related empirical research can be divided into two categories:
(1) attempts to develop hedging strategies for reducing the risk of
real returns on fixed-nominal-income securities, and (2) attempts to
establish the descriptive validity of the Long multi-period CAPM.
Bodie [1976, 1980] has sought portfolios whose returns covary
positively with unexpected inflation. He [1976] demonstrated that a
long position in the aggregate stock market could not be used to hedge
against purchasing power risk, since the market index varies negatively
with unexpected inflation. Bodie then turned to the commodities futures
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market [1980] and found that futures contracts could be used to offset
purchasing power risk. Using annual data from the 1953-1978 period, a
well-diversified portfolio of commodities futures contracts could have
been used to offset 17.4 percent of the variance of return on Treasury
Bills, while increasing mean real return from 0.4 percent to 0.67 percent.
Bodie proposes that his strategy could be a valuable alternative to the
now much-maligned variable-annuity contracts. But in general, the
strategy has somewhat limited appeal.
Biger (1975) did not explicitly identify a common stock hedge port-
folio, but he did compare real-efficient portfolios with nominally-
efficient portfolios. Over the 1950-1954 period, Biger reports vari-
ances of real return on real-efficient portfolios which are 0.3 percent
to 26.1 percent less than variances of real return on a nominally-
2
efficient portfolios with the same mean real returns. However, an
important limitation of the results is that the portfolios were constructed
using information available only on an ex-post basis. Thus, while his
results indicate that common stocks do offer hedging potential, there
is no evidence that one would be able to forecast inflation hedges and
construct successful hedge portfolios on an ex ante basis.
Examples of tests of multi-period CAPM's include those by Gouldey
[1980] and Schipper and Thompson [1981]. While Gouldey's test did not
require the actual identification of the assets to be included in an
inflation hedge portfolio, his results suggest "...that investors can
economically form portfolios of stocks and default-free securities to
hedge against consumer price level inflation and that, in average, there
3
is strong evidence for the existence of inflation risk." (p. 258)
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Schipper and Thompson [1981] did attempt to construct inflation
hedge portfolios. Although such portfolios could easily be identified
on an ex-post basis, as in Biger's study, the researchers had difficulty
in identifying inflation hedge portfolios on an ex ante basis. A hedge
portfolio was constructed by combining long and short positions in 521
common stocks. When the portfolio was constructed using information from
odd quarters, the portfolio failed to offer significant hedging potential
during even quarters
.
A problem with the approach used by Schipper and Thompson is that
rather severe requirements are placed on the data. Using their nota-
tion, the hedge portfolio is the vector X where
X = Q~\
where
0. = the variance-covariance matrix of security returns and
7 = the vector of covariance of returns with unexpected inflation.
To minimize sampling error, the authors used 21 years of quarterly data
over the period, 1954III - 1975II.
A necessary condition for any successful inflation hedging strategy
is some stability in assets' covariances of returns with unexpected in-
flation over time. But there is little reason to expect such stability
over the lengthy horizon used by Schipper and Thompson. In contrast,
the hedging strategy that we illustrate in Part III requires stability
over a shorter and more reasonable time period. Other modifications
of the Schipper-Thompson strategy are also used to mitigate the impact
of sampling error.
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III. Hedging Against Purchasing Power Risk
in a Fixed Nominal Income Stream
A. Characteristics of a Successful Hedging Strategy
The characteristics of a hedge portfolio which can be used to
transform a nominally-efficient portfolio into a real-efficient port-
folio have been derived analytically by Manaster [1979] and Sercu
[1981]. In both papers, the hedge is a zero-investment, zero-expected
real-return portfolio whose return covaries positively with (unexpected)
inflation. Both Manaster and Sercu derive precise definitions of a
hedge portfolio which could be employed in an empirical setting. How-
ever, use of those definitions would introduce the same estimation problems
which may have rendered the Schipper and Thompson strategy unsuccessful.
In contrast, our approach is based on two less precise but intui-
tively appealing characteristics, referred to below as effectiveness
and efficiency, which must be possessed by any inflation hedge port-
folio. We then construct a strategy likely to possess these character-
istics, and which, in the absence of margin requirements, would be a
zero-investment, zero-expected-return strategy. (We will actually assume
that our strategy requires a net positive investment due to margin
requirements; however, implementation of the strategy need not, in general,
have any impact upon margins. )
Consider a return which is fixed, in nominal terms, in the amount
of 1 + R. Then the real return can be defined as:
a) at
1+i
where i denotes the inflation rate. Although the nominal return is
fixed, there exists some uncertainty surrounding the real return, since
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the inflation rate cannot be predicted with certainty. A measure of
the risk associated with the real return is:
(2) Var (^±1)
1+i
We adopt terminology used by Boonekamp [1978] and others when we
refer to this risk as purchasing power risk.
Assume that some proportion w of our wealth is invested in a port-
folio which offers a real return h characterized as follows:
(3) h = 1 + h + bu + e
where u = unexpected inflation
e = "error term
b = cov (h,u)/var(u)
h = mean real return on hedge portfolio
At this point, there exist no restrictions on the value of h. How-
ever, the strategy to be developed later will be constructed so that h
equals zero. We say that the portfolio can be used to hedge against pur-
chasing power risk if:
(4) Var[(l-w)[ii|] + w(l+h) < Var[^±|]
1+i 1+i
Within this context, Bodie [1976] has developed a measure of the
risk-reducing potential of a hedge portfolio. The percentage reduction
in total risk, which can be achieved by investing w percent of wealth
in the hedge is
:
(5) S = Var(S)
-1
'
*i
Var (0) [(1+R+b)"]
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where
(6) w
(1+R) (1+R+b)
(l+R+b)
2 +^7Var(u)
By combining the hedge portfolio with the investment in a fixed
nominal income stream, risk is reduced to:
(7) (l-S)[Var(-g|)]
Note that since u and R are already given, the value of the hedge
depends only on b and Var(e) . In this paper, we say that b provides a
measure of the efficiency of the hedge and Var(e) provides a measure of
the effectiveness of the hedge. As explained below with the aid of
Figure 1, a good hedge must be both efficient and effective.
h /(return on hedge) /
/ A Slope = b =
^
• /
/ Efficiency
{
4
i
^
Dispersion = Var(
Effectiveness/•
'
/
• i
, /
•/•
i (unexpect
inflation
Figure - 1
Illustration of Hedge Effectiveness and Efficiency
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Eff iciency . As can be seen in equation (5) , the percentage reduction
in total risk (S) is higher, the greater is b. Furthermore, if b is
very high, then it will generally be possible to offset a substantial
degree of purchasing power risk with only a small investment in the
hedge. Thus, we say that the hedge is more efficient, the higher is b.
Many of the assets traditionally considered good inflation hedges
are actually quite inefficient. Consider housing as an example.
Quarterly data provided by Fama and Schwert [1977] indicate that when
unexpected inflation is 1 percent, the nominal value of housing tends
to rise only 0.45 percent (that is, b = .45). In contrast, we will
demonstrate a strategy using common stocks (during the 1974-1979 period)
which offers an expected return of 4.2 percent in a period with 1 per-
cent inflation (b = 4.2). In this case, ignoring non-inflation risk,
a $5,000 investment in the common stock hedging strategy could offset
the same amount of purchasing power risk as a $55,000 investment in
housing.
Effectiveness . So long as b > -(1+R) , the hedge portfolio can be used
to offset at least some purchasing power risk. (Note that S and w in
equations (5) and (6) are both positive only when b > -(1+R) .) However,
a high value of b does not guarantee that the hedge portfolio will offset
a substantial amount of total risk. The reason is that, even while
offsetting some purchasing power risk, an asset could introduce new risks,
such that total risk does not decline significantly. Since the variable
e in equation (3) captures variation in the hedge return, which is not
correlated with unexpected inflation, we call Var(e) a measure of "non-
inflation risk". Note that in equation (5), S is shown to be a declining
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functicn of Var(e). We say that a hedge is very effective if it off-
sets some purchasing power risk, while not adding too much non-inflation
risk, so that total risk can be substantially reduced.
Some assets traditionally considered good inflation hedges are in-
effective, at least when viewed individually. A good example is gold.
Over the July 1974 through December 1979 period, the price of gold rose,
on the average, 1 percent for each 1 percent of unanticipated inflation.
Thus, gold could have been used to hedge against purchasing power risk.
However, over 99 percent of the variation in the price of gold was non-
inflation risk. An investor who used a $10,000 investment in gold to
offset part of the purchasing power risk of a $100,000 investment in
three-month Treasury bills would actually have increased total risk by
nearly 500 percent. And a variance-minimizing combination of gold and
Treasury bills could have reduced total risk of the Treasury bills by
less than a fraction of a percent.
E. Common Stocks As Hedges Against Purchasing Power Risk
Empirical results presented below require estimates of unexpected
inflation. The approach adopted is to assume that unexpected inflation
is equal to the difference between the expected and the realized real
return on Treasury bills. The approach differs from that of Fama
[1975] in that the expected real return is not assumed equal to a
constant. Rather, we use a moving average model which allows for a
g
fluctuating expected real return. The resulting implied forecasts
of expected inflation appear to be unbiased and efficient over the
1960-1979 period.
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It should be noted that estimates of unexpected inflation are sub-
ject to measurement error. Because of this measurement error, coeffi-
cients from regressions using our estimates as independent variables
will be biased toward zero. This bias tends to weaken the power of our
empirical tests.
Common Stocks On Average: A Poor Inflation Hedge
We now examine the possibility of using the market portfolio as
an inflation hedge. Several previous researchers, including Jaffe and
Mandelker [1976], Bodie [1976], and Fama and Schwert [1977] have shown
that common stock indexes covary negatively with unanticipated infla-
tion. Regressing quarterly real returns of a NYSE index on our esti-
mates of unexpected inflation and updating earlier results through 1979,
Table I shows that previous results are confirmed. For the combined
period, for every 1 percent increase in unexpected inflation, the com-
mon stock return tended to fall by over 6 percent.
TABLE I
Common Stock Index Real Returns** versus Unexpected Inflation
1960 - 1979 (80 observations)
2
Quarterly Index Return = .014 - 6.68* (UNEXPECTED INFLATION) R = 0.14
(-3.58) Var(e) = 0.0064
1960 - 1969 (40 observations) 9
Quarterly Index Return = .016 - 5.89** (UNEXPECTED INFLATION) R~ = 0.10
(-2.07) Var(e) = 0.0045
1970 - 1979 (40 observations) -
Quarterly Index Return - .011 - 6.92* (UNEXPECTED INFLATION) R" =0.15
(-2.64) Var(e) = 0.0086
*Based on T statistics (in parentheses), significant at the 5% level
or less
**Based on the NYSE Value Weighted Index obtained from the CRSP Tape.
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Although it is clear that a long position in the stock market
portfolio cannot serve as a hedge against unexpected inflation, Bodie
[1976] posited that perhaps a short position could serve as a good
hedge. But using cur quarterly data from the 1960-1979 period and
equation (5) to compute S, a short position in the market could have
reduced the total risk associated with a fixed quarterly nominal in-
9
come stream by less than 18 percent. This reduction in total risk
would be achieved at the significant cost of holding a short position
in the market portfolio.
Individual Common Stocks As Inflation Hedges
Although the market portfolio as a whole serves as a poor infla-
tion hedge, it is possible that certain individual stocks or combina-
tions of individual stocks could serve as valuable hedges. To examine
this possibility, we chose a sample of 571 common stocks for which
quarterly returns were available on the CRSP tape from 1960 through
1979.
Table II presents a list of the 20 most efficient and 20 least
efficient stocks in our sample over the 1960-1979 period. Note that
even the most efficient hedges do not have b-coef ficients which are
significantly positive. In fact, over 73 percent of the sample stocks
had real returns which were significantly below zero.
It is interesting to examine the types of stocks which appear on
the lists of good and poor hedges. The good hedges are dominated by
mining and oil companies. The worst hedges are dominated by airlines
and consumer-oriented firms such as retailers and soft drink producers.
-12-
These patterns are more easily perceived in the industry analysis of
Table III. The industries least affected by unanticipated inflation
are mining and oil and gas. The industries most adversely affected by
unexpected inflation include retailing, textiles, airlines, beverages,
apparel, and motion pictures. Each of these industries markets products
which have been referred to as "non-essential consumption goods." It
appears that during periods of unexpectedly high prices, consumers cope
with tight budgets by avoiding expenditures on items such as soft drinks,
movies, clothing, and air travel. Note that other industries dealing
with "essential" consumption goods (e.g., groceries and food manufac-
turers) are not nearly so affected by unexpected inflation,,
[Tables II and III about here]
Since no individual stock has a significantly positive correlation
with unexpected inflation, it is obvious that no single stock could be
an efficient hedge. Furthermore, since 75 percent to 100 percent of
the risk associated with individual stocks is non-inflation risk, indi-
vidual stocks would tend to be very ineffective hedges. The strategy
presented now combines certain individual stocks to form a portfolio
which is both an efficient and effective hedge.
C. A Strategy To Hedge Against Purchasing Power Risk
The essence of the strategy is to assume a long position in stocks
which are predicted to be the "best" hedges and an offsetting short
position in the stocks which are predicted to be the "worst" hedges.
The portfolio should include enough stocks to diversify away much non-
inflation risk. At the same time, such a combination should yield a
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portfolio with a high b-coefficient. To understand this, consider
stocks A and B with b-coeff icients equal to 1 and -5, respectively.
Although neither stock, on an individual basis, is very efficient, a
combination of a long position in A and a short position in B offers
a b-coeff icient of 6 and is thus more efficient than either A or B.
The offsetting of long and short positions can thus yield an efficient
hedge portfolio. Note also that, if the systematic risk of the long
and short positions are comparable, the scheme represents a zero-expected-
return strategy.
Implementation of the strategy requires the definition of "best"
and "worst" hedges. If individual stocks were ranked according to their
b-coefficients, the resulting long and short positions would tend not
12
to have comparable systematic risk. To avoid this problem we in-
stead rank the stocks based upon correlations of return with unexpected
inflation.
The success of the strategy depends on how well one can predict
the best and worst hedges. We present results here for two cases.
First, we assume that the investor is clairvoyant and is capable of
predicting perfectly the 50 stocks with the highest correlations of
returns with unanticipated inflation and the 50 stocks with the lowest
correlations. In the second case, we use historical market data to
predict the correlation coefficients.
To avoid distortion in inflation rates caused by wage and price
13
controls, the strategy was tested only for periods after June, 1974.
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Case 1: "Perfect" Foresight
Returns of each of the 574 stocks in our sample were regressed
against unanticipated inflation, using quarterly data from July 1974
through Decmeber 1979. A long position was assumed in the 50 stocks
with the highest correlations of real returns with unexpected infla-
tion; a short position was assumed in the 50 stocks with the lowest
correlations. No portfolio revision was allowed over the five and one-
half year period.
Regressing the real return on the hedge portfolio against unexpected
inflation, the result is
Real return on hedge portfolio = .01 + 11.02* (unexpected inflation)
(4.62)
9
^Significant at .0005 level (one-tailed test) R = .52
Var(e) = .0050
Note that 11.02 = b, the measure of hedge efficiency, is high. Further,
2
since the R for the equation is a reasonably high .52, other sources
of risk are reasonably low. In terms of the earlier graph, the hedge
should also be relatively effective. Using equations (5) and (6) to
compute S and W, we find that this is true. S = 55 percent and
W = 4.6 percent. In other words, by investing in the hedge 4.6 percent
of the amount invested in Treasury bills, 55 percent of purchasing
power risk could have been eliminated. Since all of the risk associated
with Treasury bills is purchasing power risk, the strategy would then
reduce total risk by 55 percent.
Although the strategy was designed to yield a zero expected real
return, the actual mean real return on the hedge portfolio was 1.7
-15-
percent per quarter, which is in excess of the mean real return on Treasury
bills over this period (-0.37 percent per quarter). Thus, during the
period examined, the strategy could have reduced total risk while in-
creasing mean return.
Without Perfect Foresight
Using only past returns data, the correlations of unexpected in-
flation with returns of stocks for the prior six-year period were used
to select the 50 best and 50 worst (predicted) hedges. For example,
the 50 best predicted hedges for 1979 would be the 50 stocks whose cor-
relations were highest over the 1973 through 1978 period. A long posi-
tion is assumed in the 50 best predicted hedges and a short position
14
is assumed in the 50 worst predicted hedges.
The return on the combined hedge portfolio was then calculated
over the July 1974-December 1979 period. When the quarterly real re-
turn on the portfolio was regressed against unanticipated inflation,
the following estimates were obtained.
Real return on hedge portfolio = .01 + 4.23* (unexpected inflation)
2
R = .19
Var(e) = .0033
(2.17)
^significant at the .025 level (one-tailed test)
Computing S and W, we have S = 26 percent and W = 5 percent.
A $50,000 investment in each of the long and short positions, when
combined with a $950,000 investment in Treasury bills, would offer a
variance of real return which is 26 percent lower than the variance of
real return associated with a $100,000 investment in only Treasury bills,
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Again, while the expected real return on the hedge portfolio was approxi-
mately zero, the actual mean real return was about 1 percent per quarter.
Therefore, the hedging strategy, while reducing risk, would have increased
the mean real return on Treasury bills from a 0.37 percent loss to a 0.26
percent loss.
IV. Hedging Potential and the Long CAPM
The hedging strategy discussed above can easily be tested in the
context of the Long CAPM and compared with the results of Schipper and
Thompson [1981] by working with covariances instead of correlations. "
Referring back to equation (1), V is the vector of covariances of
.stocks returns with unexpected inflation. Our strategy is to rank
securities using sample estimates of the elements of V (say V.)
derived from quarterly data over the prior six-year period. Portfolio
weights are not assigned to all securities in our sample, as required
by equation (1). Rather, we again assume a long position in the 50
stocks with the highest values of V. and a short position in the 50
stocks with the lowest values of V.. In this way, we greatly reduce
the possibility that sampling error would cause a "bad hedge" to be
included in the long position, and vice versa. The resulting combined
portfolio is held for one year; then new estimates of V are derived and
the portfolio is revised.
Hedging potential exists if there is a significant positive relation-
ship between the return on the hedge portfolio and unexpected inflation.
We address this issue by examining the coefficients of the following
two regressions:
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C8) rht
= a + a
2
U
t
+ e
t
(9) rht
= a
Q
+ airmt
+ a
2
u
t
+ e
t
r = real return on hedge portfolio in period t
r = real return on market portfolio in period t
mt v
u = unanticipated inflation in period t
Table IV compares the results of our strategy with the Schipper
and Thompson [1981] results. Whereas the Schipper and Thompson port-
folio does not covary significantly with unanticipated inflation, in
TABLE IV
regression
a.
t(a
x
)
Schipper &
Thompson
(7/54 -
(quarterly
(8)
6/75)
data)
(9)
-
-1.59
-
-5.43
1.25 .28
.65 .04
.005 .29
Our
Result:s
(7/74-12/79)
(quarterly data)
(8) (9)
-
-
.377
-
-2.16
8.88** 6.49*
3.14** 2.30*
.33 .46
a
2
t(a
2
)
R
2
*significant at .025 level based on one-tailed test.
**significant at .005 level based on one-tailed test.
contrast, our procedure indicates significant hedging potential. The
dramatic difference in results is possibly explained by the different
procedures used to form the hedge portfolio, the use of different in-
flation expectations models, or by the different time periods examined.
However, procedures employed here should place fewer demands on available
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data and are more reasonable in terms of stationarity requirements. Use
of a time period characterized by higher magnitudes of unexpected inflation
also increases the power of statistical tools used to identify "good"
and "bad" hedges.
Conclusion
In a world of uncertain inflation, a rationale for acquiring hedge
portfolios has been provided in both single and multi-period versions
of capital asset pricing theory. In this study, we have provided
empirical evidence of the existence of common stock portfolios that
are effective and efficient hedges against unexpected inflation. As
far as we know, our results provide the first evidence which suggests
that one can construct, on an ex-ante basis, common stock portfolos
which have significant hedging potential.
From a practical standpoint, the results may be useful for cer-
tain large investors or investment fund managers. For example, some
pension funds make payments to retirees that are tied to an inflation
index. In funds which include equity investments, a manager could
divert funds from individual stocks which are among the worst hedges
to stocks considered best hedges in order to help prevent or reduce
large investment losses in the very periods when payments jump un-
expectedly. The success of such a strategy will depend somewhat on
the effects of transaction costs that we did not explicitly consider
in the study, and the ability to forecast good and bad inflation hedges.
From a theoretical standpoint, the results have important impli-
cations for capital asset pricing in a multi-period setting. Hedging
-19-
potential is a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for the
superiority of the multi-period CAPM over the conventional paradigm.
Schipper and Thompson met with very little success in hedging against
shifts in price level. In contrast, our results indicate that when
hedging strategies depend only on data from recent (six-year) market
history, common stocks can indeed offer significant inflation-hedging
potential.
Several extensions of the study are warranted. In the present
study, we examined only one point on the efficient frontier, the point
where purchasing power risk was the only uncertainty. The methodology
can be extended to develop more points on the efficient frontier and we
are in the process of doing just that. Further useful extensions in-
volve examining the effects of combining common stocks and other poten-
tial inflation hedge assets, such as commodities.
Although there appears to be sufficient stationarity to form ef-
fective inflation hedges through a statistical analysis of past data,
little theory has been provided concerning those factors that determine
which assets are good or bad inflation hedges . The development of this
underlying theory would hopefully result in improved hedging ability.
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FCOTNOTES
Bodie [1980], page 12.
2
These amounts are calculated using data in Biger's Table 10.
3
This conclusion must be interpreted with some caution. It is
based upon an empirical test which assumes that the Long CAPM correctly
describes the return- generating process.
4
In calculating amounts invested in our hedging strategy of
Section IIIC, we will assume that a 50 percent margin is required on
both long and short positions. The amount invested in the hedge
(referred to as w throughout section III) is equal to the amount of
the margin.
It is important to note, however, that when a hedge portfolio is
used in conjunction with a market portfolio of stocks, long and short
positions in the hedge stocks are, in reality, additions to or reductions
of long positions within the market portfolio. In this (more general)
case, the addition of a hedge portfolio to an investment strategy need
not require any additional net investment.
Fama and Schwert regressed nominal returns on housing against
unexpected inflation, to obtain a regression coefficient of .45. Then
an estimate of the regression coefficient for real returns on housing
is -.55. The ratio of (1+R+b) for our hedging strategy is then over
11 times as large as (1+R+b) for housing.
The following equation xras estimated by regressing nominal
returns on gold against unexpected inflation, using quarterly data
from the period 1974III-1979IV.
r = .057 + 1.05 (unexpected inflation
2
= .003
T = .0245
The realized return on Treasury bills was approximated by sub-
tracting the increase in the Consumer Price Index from nominal Treasury
bill returns.
8
The model used was:
E(x
t
) = -e1
a
t_1
- e
2
a
t_2
- e
3
a
t_4
+ 6
where
a. . = X. . + 6-a. . . + 9„a. . „ + 6-a. , - - <5t-x t-i 1 t-i-1 2 t-i-2 3 t-i-3
Procedures commonly used in estimation of Box-Jenkins forecasting models
were used to re-estimate 6-
, 0_, 6_ and 6 each quarter, using the most
recent 28 observations.
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The above model was chosen from among alternative candidates for
several reasons, A moving average model incorporates a "learning effect"
\vhich can enable it to be robust with respect to instability in the be-
havior of the time series. Moving average terms at the second and
fourth lags were included in part because some seasonality exists in
the Consumer Price Index. This seasonality may arise because some items
in the "typical market basket" are not sampled every month. For example,
college tuition is sampled on an annual basis. Some items are sampled
semiannually
.
o
"This is in agreement with Bodie's estimate, although he used
annual data from a different period (1953-1972)
.
The portion of variance of real return which was not correlated
with unexpected inflation in our sample of 571 firms over the 1960-1979
period ranged from 78.7 percent to 100 percent.
"Note that the regression coefficient of the combined stocks is
equal to the sum of the coefficients of the individual stocks.
_
Cov(Exj,y)
_.
E[(Zxj-E(Ixj))(y-E(y))]
Zx Var(y) Var(y)
E[(x
1
-E(x
1
))(y-E(y)] E[(x
2
-E(x
2
» (y-E(y))
]
+
+ ...
Var(y) Var(y)
E[(x
n
-E(x
n
)(y-E(y)]
Var(y)
Cov(x
1 ,y)
Cov(x
2 ,y)
Cov(x
n
,y)
Var(y) + Var(y) + '" Var(y)
= b + b + ... b12 n
12
This is so because, as one would expect, the covariance of
returns with unexpected inflation is highly correlated with systematic
risk. However, the same appears not to be true of correlations of
returns with unexpected inflation. For example, this systematic risk
of the long position in the hedging strategy (without perfect fore-
sight) was .98, while that of the short position was 1.06. The dif-
ference between the two estimates is statistically insignificant.
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13
See Fama [1975], pages 274-275.
Note that the strategy allows portfolio revision; annual turn-
over averaged about 35 percent.
Within the context of the Long CAPM, the hedge portfolio need
not have zero systematic risk or a zero expected return. Thus, it is
not necessary to rank stocks on correlations so as to achieve a hedge
portfolio with zero systematic risk. In fact, Long's theory, together
with available empirical evidence, would suggest that the hedge portfolio
return should covary negatively with aggregate market returns. This
is indeed the case in our hedging strategy.
-25-
Biger, "The Assessment of Inflation and Portfolio Selection," Journal
of Finance
,
May 1975.
Eodie, "Common Stocks as Hedges Against Inflation," Journal of Finance
,
May 1976.
Bodie, "An Innovation for Stable Real Retirement Income," Journal of
Portfolio Management , Fall 1980,
Boonekamp, "Inflation, Hedging, and the Demand for Money," American
Economic Review , December 1978.
Fama, "Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation," American
Economic Review , June 1975.
Fama and Schwert, "Asset Returns and Inflation," Journal of Financial
Economics , November 1977.
Jaffe and Mandelker, "The 'Fisher Effect' for Risky Assets: An Empirical
Investigation," Journal of Finance , May 1976
„
Long, "Stock Prices, Inflation, and the Term Structure of Interest
Rates," Journal of Financial Economics , Volume I, 1974.
Manaster, "Real and Nominal Efficient Sets," Journal of Finance , March
1979.
Nelson, "Inflation and Rates of Return on Stocks," Journal of Finance ,
May 1976.
Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk," Journal of Finance , September 1964.
Schipper and Thompson, "Common Stocks as Hedges Against Shifts in the
Consumption or Investment Opportunity Set," Journal of Business ,
April 1981c
Sercu, "A Note on Real and Nominal Efficient Sets," Journal of Finance ,
June 1981.
M/B/225

fe&i '
:
.
.;; \:



HECKMAN UJ
BINDERY INC. |H|
JUN95
Bound
-To -Pitas? N.MANCHESTER,
INDIANA 46962

